Roots of Distrust: Betrayal, Real or Feared For all the hand-wringing over the decision to release photographs of the bloodied corpses of Uday and Qusay Hussein, it had to be done, to hear many Iraqis tell it � not just because of their fear that the old regime could return, but because of their memories of American duplicity in Iraq. When American officials describe the difficulties they face in Iraq, the failure to capture Saddam Hussein continues to be cited as a principal reason that insurgents feel emboldened to strike American soldiers. But in the view of many Iraqis � Sunni as well as Shiite, Baghdadis and rural folk � that is just half the picture. To them, the fear of Mr. Hussein, his henchmen and his loyalists is compounded enormously by the dishonesty and disloyalty they feel Americans showed to Mr. Hussein's antagonists during the gulf war in 1991, when American troops pulled back even as Iraqis were rising up to challenge his rule.� Given the depth of the United States' military commitment to Iraq, and its obvious importance to President Bush, Americans may be tempted to dismiss such sentiments as improbable paranoia. But consider the experience of a population that has had very little reliable information during the past 35 years, and has had far too much of rumor, conspiracy theories and propaganda. And, more to the point, terror. In such an environment, even good information becomes difficult to believe. Who can say for sure that it, too, isn't some form of calculated lie? What's more, distrust of Americans is a lesson many Iraqis learned the hard way. On Feb. 15, 1991, during the Persian Gulf war, President George H. W. Bush publicly encouraged "the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside." American land forces soon thrust across southern Iraq to oust Mr. Hussein's forces from Kuwait, but when that goal had been accomplished, the Americans suspended offensive operations and offered Iraq a cease-fire. Days later, they stood by as Mr. Hussein sent his helicopters to quash uprisings, or intifadas, that were spreading quickly from Basra across southern Iraq. Mr. Hussein's forces also lashed out furiously at rebellious Kurds in the north. At the time, American policy was heavily influenced by fears that such rebellions could splinter Iraq and lead to Iranian influence in the south. During the uprisings, southern Iraqis killed Mr. Hussein's local henchmen and Baath officials in large cities like Kerbala and Najaf. Once the rebellions had been quelled, thousands of young men � and often whole families � who were suspected of disloyalty to Mr. Hussein were driven to mass grave sites, where they were machine-gunned or buried alive. Memories of the slaughter of 1991 are now being reinforced by excavations across the country of mass graves. News of them plays in a particularly corrosive way into news of the failure of the coalition forces to account for Saddam Hussein. Even as Americans try to bring everyday Iraqis into the coalition fold, the excavations remind the Iraqis of what could happen if the Americans don't fully uproot the old regime. Indeed, Baathists in hiding have already begun murdering some Iraqis who go to work for the Americans, even as taped messages of defiance from Saddam Hussein continue to surface. In Mosul, Nasser Hazim, no relation to the shopkeeper, walked with his children on Thursday morning in front of his home, near the site of the shootout, and said few Iraqis were bothered by the outcome. "Maybe one percent of the people liked Uday and Qusay," he said. "People aren't sorry. But they want some proof they have been killed. They don't want words and they don't want media. People aren't ready to help the Americans because they are always promising, always promising." http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/weekinreview/27OPPE.html?pagewanted=all&position=